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Abstract This article explores the concept of blame in
organizations. Existing work suggests that ‘no-blame’
approaches (or cultures) may be conducive to organiza-
tional learning and may foster innovation. However, both
the apparently strong public appetite for blaming, and
research into no-blame approaches, suggest that wider
application of ‘no-blame’ in organizations may not be
straightforward. The article explores the contribution of the
rich philosophical literature on blame to this debate, and
considers the implications of philosophical ideas for the
no-blame idea. In doing so, it identifies conceptual and
practical issues, sheds light on why the benefits of ‘no-
blame’ may be difficult to realize, and offers the basis for
an alternative approach. The article also contributes by
providing foundations for future research, and identifies
some fruitful lines of enquiry.
Keywords Blame  Communities of practice  Error-
reporting  Leadership  Organizational learning 
Philosophy  Virtue ethics
Introduction
There has been a developing interest—in public, profes-
sional, and academic discourse—in the idea of fostering
‘no-blame’ approaches (or cultures) in organizations. A
central theme is whether blame may be a barrier or inhi-
bitor to organizational learning (Vince and Saleem 2004;
Shilling and Kluge 2009; Provera et al. 2010; Tjosvold
et al. 2004; Gronewold et al. 2013; Uribe et al. 2002;
Busby 2006). If employees are free from the fear of blame,
they may be more likely to be open about errors and engage
with others in learning from them, enabling the organiza-
tion to identify problems and make systemic improvements
to its operations (Provera et al. 2010). A second conse-
quence may be that employees are liberated to take risks
and to innovate, potentially contributing to the firm’s
competitive advantage (Farson and Keyes 2002). However,
this literature also recognizes that difficulties exist in
developing and sustaining no-blame cultures in practice,
and that the ability to do so may depend on organization
type and context (Provera et al. 2010).
Philosophers (e.g. Wallace 1994; Scanlon 2008) have
devoted a good deal of attention to exploring the nature of
blame and understanding its place in our lives, often
reaching widely divergent conclusions with potentially
profound implications. However, the organizational no-
blame literature rarely recognizes or addresses this, or
makes explicit its assumptions about the nature of blame. It
seems conceivable that insights from the philosophical
literature on blame may enrich organizational thinking on
blame, and shed light on some of the difficulties sur-
rounding the concept of no-blame.
The purpose of this article is to establish points of
connection between the organizational no-blame literature
and the body of philosophical writing on blame. We con-
sider the extent to which the latter has purchase on orga-
nizational thinking around blame, paying specific attention
to the issue as to whether philosophers and organizational
writers are working with the same conception of blame.
We explore the extent to which philosophical ideas may be
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implicit in no-blame thinking, their potential to put ideas
around organizational blame onto a firmer theoretical foot-
ing, and how the no-blame idea may be evaluated in rela-
tion to the philosophy of blame. We also consider whether
the philosophical debates point to alternatives to no-blame.
The article is exploratory in nature. By opening a dia-
logue between two apparently related but currently parallel
literatures, its aim is to do some groundwork for future
research. As a ‘first cut’ at this endeavour, the article does
not seek to offer substantive conclusions as to the merits of
the no-blame idea in the light of the philosophical rea-
soning. Rather its contribution lies in identifying where the
main conceptual and practical issues might lie, and offering
some thoughts on how they might be approached. In doing
so, it provides a foundation for future theoretical and
empirical work on the subject.
The article starts with a review of the organizational no-
blame literature before offering a synthesis of the extensive
philosophical literature on blame. This provides a foun-
dation for a discussion of the implications of the philo-
sophical literature for an understanding of organizational
(no-) blame. The article proceeds to reflect on possible
limits to applying philosophical concepts to blame in
organizations. It concludes by considering an alternative to
no-blame and identifying an agenda for future theoretical
development and empirical enquiry.
No-Blame Cultures
‘… I don’t do blame … Blame will not produce
anything productive at all.’ Sharon Shoesmith, former
Director of Haringey Social Services (UK),
responding to questions in a BBC radio interview (28/
3/2011) following the ‘Baby P’ child abuse case
(BBC 2011)
‘Looking for someone to blame might satisfy our
base desire but will it really help us next time
around?’ (Holmes 2010, p. 389. following the Vic-
toria bushfires, Australia)
‘[we should A]bandon blame as a tool, and trust the
goodwill and good intentions of the staff.’ (NAGSPE
2013, p. 4, ‘the Berwick Report’ on patient safety in
the UK National Health Service, following patient
mistreatment scandals)
‘We have to have a proper analysis rather than
scapegoating and ‘‘blame gaming’’.’ (BBC 2015,
Harriet Harman, Acting Leader of the UK Labour
Party, following defeat in the 2015 General Election)
These quotations reflect a recurring strand in public
discourse that there may be something unproductive, or
even counter-productive, about blaming someone when
something goes wrong. At best, it seems, blaming may be a
misuse of energy and resources; at worst, it may inhibit
learning from mistakes and making improvements—a view
captured by Admiral Lang in his comments on the Costa
Concordia cruise liner disaster: ‘… I pray that the apparent
desire to apportion blame will not undermine the overrid-
ing need to identify the key issues that underpin this ter-
rible accident’ (Lang 2013, p. 21).
Both Holmes and Lang allude to a tension between a
tendency towards blaming and the potential benefits of
refraining from doing so. We shall explore this tension
later in the article. However, this public commentary in the
wake of major disasters around the utility of blame also
reflects an emerging theme in the management literature
concerned with the development of no-blame cultures in
organizations, the benefits they may bestow, and difficul-
ties that might be encountered in developing and nurturing
them. We start by examining this literature.
Provera et al. (2010, p. 1058) define ‘no-blame’ as ‘an
organizational approach characterized by a constructive
attitude towards errors and near misses’. Central to this is
the idea that human error is inevitable, but that systems are
open to improvement. In a no-blame approach, the focus is
moved away from identifying the perpetrator(s) of the error
(often with associated shame or punishment) to identifying
the lessons that could be learned so that processes can be
improved. The focus is on organizational learning (Senge
2006; Vince and Saleem 2004), and the underlying logic is
that an organization’s blaming practices may be amongst
the things that inhibit this (Provera et al. 2010; Schilling
and Kluge 2009), as these may focus management energy
and effort on identifying individual(s) responsible for a
mistake, rather than on the more productive activity of
examining wider systems that require adjustment if the
error is not to be repeated. In addition, by discouraging the
reporting of mistakes or near-misses by individuals (War-
ing 2005), blame cultures may make organizational learn-
ing from these events impossible.1 Finally, blaming
practices may inhibit the participation of individuals in
learning when their errors have come to light, with the
consequence that employees who are concerned with
defending themselves, or deflecting blame, will be unlikely
to engage in collective reflection or contribute to wider
learning (Vince and Saleem 2004). Provera et al. also note
that no-blame approaches, through an acceptance of error
and openness around an event, can help organizations to
avoid learning the ‘wrong things’ (2010, p. 1059), such as
being fatalistic about error or over-confident in the ability
of their systems to avoid it—in other words, to steer a path
1 Although as Waring argues in relation to medical incident
reporting, blame cultures may not be the only culprit here, and that
the wider context of professional cultures need to be considered.
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between the destructive effects arising in ‘blame cultures’
from either an excessive fear of blame or from a perceived
immunity from it.
In avoiding these negative consequences of blame, the
no-blame approaches identified by Provera et al. (2010)
typically involve the following elements (Weick and
Sutcliffe 2001): firstly, error-reporting procedures that are
‘safe’ for individuals, and which actively encourage the
recording and reporting of problems and ‘near-misses’
(Gronewold et al. 2013). Secondly, processes for reflect-
ing on errors and problems, and learning from them, that
are inclusive (not least of those who have reported or
experienced them) and holistic, i.e. that look for both
proximal and distal causes across wider organizational
systems. Thirdly, systems for identifying and imple-
menting improvements, which are then communicated
positively and openly. It is here that we can see why the
term ‘(no-)blame culture’ (Vince and Saleem 2004) is
sometimes used, as all three of these elements rely on
certain values and assumptions being present amongst
employees and managers; a willingness to be open about
mistakes, a trust that managers will not abuse this open-
ness, a culture of involvement and sharing knowledge
across hierarchies and departmental boundaries, and a
practice of developing and celebrating positive narratives
around error resolution—the ‘story of the error’, as Pro-
vera et al. (2010, p. 1059) put it.
A second benefit of a no-blame culture may lie in the
encouragement of risk-taking and innovation. Most orga-
nizations will require employees to take risks of some sort,
though the magnitude and nature of these risks will vary.
Creative or research-based industries are very obvious
environments where risk-taking is required, but in more
mainstream organizations there are risks in developing
products, entering new markets, and offering or with-
drawing services. Where managers and employees operate
in a climate where they are blamed for failure, innovation
and risk-taking are likely to be stifled (Farson and Keyes
2002; Schilling and Kluge 2009). Vince and Saleem (2004)
show that this relationship is not one way, but that caution
and blame can feed off each other. Caution can lead to the
tendency to externalize problems by blaming others, and
the resulting climate of blame in turn begets caution—
inhibiting innovation (and also reflection and collective
learning, as noted above). Not only may the desire to avoid
blame, where this is a culturally prevalent practice, inhibit
innovation, it also constrains the potential learning, indi-
vidual and organizational, that might arise from that. There
is concern, for example, that doctors may avoid introducing
new and/or potentially risky procedures in a climate where
their failure rates are made public, and this might apply
more widely to the organizations they work for, which may
have objectives to preserve league table positions. The
same may apply in education, to teachers developing new
approaches, or university lecturers developing new courses.
Despite these espoused advantages of no-blame
approaches, and the apparent anti-blame zeitgeist (Sher
2006; Owens 2000, 2012; Franklin 2013), it is not clear
how widely the concept of no-blame is applied in organi-
zations. As Provera et al. (2010) point out, much of the
extant research has concerned itself with no-blame
approaches in what the authors call High Reliability
Organizations (HROs). These are organizations that oper-
ate with constant risk of large-scale disaster (airlines,
nuclear installations, shipping lines, etc.), and thus have a
need for highly reliable operating systems. Here, the
heightened imperative to avoid high-impact error creates
an environment where it is possible (and, arguably, nec-
essary) to have a no-blame approach so that the necessary
organizational learning can take place to prevent future
catastrophe. Indeed, there is an incentive for minor errors
and near-misses to be embraced as they generate positive
opportunities for improvements in systems. However, the
benefits may be less obvious in organizations that do not
operate under the constant risk of catastrophe. Indeed, no-
blame approaches may not offer benefits alone. Busby
(2006) provides an example of an unfortunate side-effect of
no-blame in the rail industry, where train drivers readily
accepted attribution of error as there was no blame
apportioned, and this actually inhibited investigation of
systemic failures.
As Provera et al. (2010) show, there are operational
costs to implementing no-blame approaches—in time
devoted to developing and operating processes designed to
learn from error, staff development, and overcoming
existing structural and cultural barriers, for example, hier-
archies, vertical communication systems, top-down man-
agement styles, and cultures of error denial in the context
of regulatory and litigious environments. The question
arises as to whether these costs are justifiable for more
mainstream organizations in the context of their relative
lack of exposure to risk of large-scale disaster. Of course,
as Provera et al. (2010) acknowledge, the dividing line
between HROs and other organizations is not clear cut.
Recent experience tells us that organizations not (previ-
ously) readily associated with major risk, for example
banks or broadcasting companies, may experience far-
reaching human and corporate disasters.2 In any case, as
these authors conclude, the benefits of organizational
learning enabled by no-blame approaches are potentially
universal, so there would be no a priori reason to rule out
the extension of no-blame practices more widely.
2 Illustrated, for example, by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and
the Jimmy Savile scandal at the BBC.
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What is Blame?
No-blame approaches, it seems, have much to recommend
them, and—costs notwithstanding—there appears to be a
good case for extending their application more widely than
to the high-risk organizations where they have received
most attention. However, we wish to argue here that such a
conclusion would rest on infirm ground without an
understanding of the nature of blame and its place in
human life. Whether we should, or indeed can, dispense
with blame—or constrain it—surely depends on what we
think blame is. One of the curious features of the literature
concerned with no-blame cultures and approaches is that it
very rarely considers—at least explicitly—the ontology of
its central concept. Philosophers have devoted considerable
attention to unpacking blame and blaming practices,
reaching profoundly diverse conclusions which have
important implications for our understanding of blame in
organizations. Our aim in this section is to provide a firmer
foundation for an exploration of the no-blame concept by
exploring the philosophy of blame.
We start by considering a position which has a long
tradition in utilitarian philosophy, and which concords with
many popular intuitions about blame. Under this concep-
tion, blame is regarded as a sanction, and one that is
socially useful. According to this view, ‘to blame someone
is simply to express disapproval of his bad behaviour or
character in a way that is calculated to mitigate or improve
it’ (Sher 2006, p. 72). It forms part of ‘an economy of
threats’ (Wallace 1994, p. 54). Implicit here is the idea that
the sanction works because blame is unpleasant to the
recipient and recognition of this fact will cause him to
avoid incurring it in future. Blame, in this account, is
‘punishment light’ (Sher 2006, p. 73). Also implicit in this
approach is the view that blame is appropriate in respect of
things people choose to do—there would be very little
point in using blame as a sanction, if people could not
choose to do differently next time. Thus, the utilitarian
approach to blame links closely to a violitionist account of
blame (Levy 2005), where blame is seen as being limited in
its applicability to what people do voluntarily. A variation
of this approach would be what Owens (2000) calls a
juridical account of blame, where the scope of blame is
extended a little more widely to encompass what people
can control. The scope still remains narrow, not extending
to, for example, aspects of people’s character, for example
their orientation towards others.
Despite its intuitive appeal, the utilitarian view of blame
has come under sustained critique in the philosophical lit-
erature. One concern is around whether blame can sensibly
be seen as a sanction, when it is not always expressed, or
not expressed to the ‘guilty’ party—we often blame
privately, or in confidence. Further, as Williams (1995)
points out, justifying blame on the grounds of its efficacy
rests on infirm ground, for blame’s efficacy in modifying
its target’s behaviour depends on the latter accepting that
the blame is justified—otherwise it will be simply ignored
or resented. Moreover, we sometimes blame people who
are not in a position to alter their future behaviour, such as
historical figures or, in an organizational context, people
who have retired or left. A second critique is that the
sanction account of blame does not capture the character of
blame. If it is true that we blame in order to influence future
events, maximum impact might involve serious blame for a
minor misdemeanour, while it might be more efficient for
very serious moral transgressions to be ignored (i.e. not
made subject to blame, Sher 2006)—however, people’s
intuition seems to be to dispense blame in relation to how
badly they feel about the act that triggers the blame. This
leads to a further point, that when we blame someone for
something we tend to feel something (Tilly 2008). It
appears that we do not apply blame dispassionately and
purposefully in the same way as, for example a medical
treatment. As Bennett argues, if the purpose of blame were
to change behaviour, it would have a therapeutic character;
however, when we blame, ‘we are not usually engaged in
any kind of therapy’ (Bennett 1980, p. 20). Blame often
involves an element of ill-feeling or even hostility, which is
hardly calculating or therapeutic. It is open to the utilitarian
to argue that we ‘add’ anger in order to give the blame
more deterrent force, but again this seems to be rather an
odd description of what we do when we blame someone.
We do not appear to ‘conjure up’ (Bennett 1980, p. 22)
emotions to accompany our blame, those emotions already
accompany it, or may even be constitutive of it.
There are two main alternatives to the utilitarian view of
blame. The first is associated primarily with Scanlon
(2008), who argues that blame is a recognition and
response to the impairment of a relationship that results
from another’s bad act or attitude. To blame a person is to
‘… take your relationship with him or her to be modified in
a way that this judgment of impaired relations holds to be
appropriate’ (2008, p. 128). This idea of judging oneself to
have been let down or having had, for example, a friend-
ship damaged, would account for the force of blame in a
way that the utilitarian account does not. Scanlon’s account
also offers an explanation for why blame is a necessary
feature of human life. Scanlon views people as having
obligations to one another—standing intentions to relate to
others, while being responsive to reason in respect of these
relations. Consequently, we have cause to think that other
people have reasons to behave/be orientated in particular
ways towards us (and others), and to call them to account
when they do not respond to these reasons. Blame arises
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from these rational obligations, and indeed not to blame is
to treat people as not rational, not responsive to reason in
this sense. Following Scanlon’s analysis, we can achieve an
understanding not only of why people blame each other,
but also an understanding of why they ought to (in
appropriate circumstances).
There are a number of objections to Scanlon’s position.
The first is to suggest that blame is not necessarily rela-
tionship-based—we blame people with whom we have no
prior relationship to impair, or for reasons that are not
related to the impairment of a relationship. Addressing this
point, Smith (2013) argues that it is better to see blame as a
form of protest, a way of registering that a standard has
been traduced, rather than a relationship impaired. Others
question whether rationality, and the obligations that arise
from that, are the basis of such relationships: ‘We do not
think of ourselves as having ‘‘ties’’ to other people solely in
virtue of sharing with them the property of rationality’
(Wallace 2008, p. 23). We can blame someone without
regarding them as generally irrational and as not possible to
engage with. The second objection is that Scanlon’s
account, like the utilitarian one, leaves the emotional
component out of blame. Blame, in Scanlon’s view, would
be to judge someone to have transgressed, whereas it is
alternatively argued that to blame is to care about that
transgression. If one were to judge someone to be blame-
worthy, but not blame them (and one might), there would
be something missing (Owens 2012), and this something is
its emotional content. Blame, according to this view, has an
element of opprobrium at the heart of it, something which
is not central to Scanlon’s account.
The second alternative view, then, is the ‘affective’
account of blame offered by Wallace and others. On this
account, blame just is a negative feeling that we have when
we feel that someone has acted badly, ‘to blame someone
… is to be subject to a reactive emotion toward them’
(Wallace 2008, p. 1), involving a ‘withdrawal of [the] good
will’ (Sher 2006, p. 80) that we would otherwise have for
people. These feelings—the reactive emotions of guilt,
resentment, indignation (Strawson 1974)—are to us both
primitive ‘expressions of our emotional make-up’ (Bennett
1980, p. 24) and natural, ‘in so far as they reflect our
internalization of moral norms, as standards that govern our
interactions with each other’ (Wallace 2008, p. 12), our
‘moral sentiments’, as Wallace has it. Scholars argue that
the existence of these feelings is what characterizes human
interaction, in contrast to an ‘objective attitude’ (Strawson
1974, p. 10) with which we might relate to a piece of
machinery. Owens (2012) is more precise about the reac-
tive emotion involved in blame—for him, it is a form of
anger.
The affective account of blame, then, holds that blame is
a natural human emotional response to being wronged or
let down, and that human relations would be unintelligible
without this class of emotional responses, of which blame
is one. Indeed, it is possible to go further and argue that
these reactive emotions are constitutive of meaningful
human relations (Owens 2012; Franklin 2013). However,
this account has its own difficulties, firstly those arising
from the observation that we have already encountered,
that we do not always feel or express anger when we blame
someone. There have been different approaches to nego-
tiating this difficulty. For example, Sher (2006) identifies a
disposition to feel anger (or other emotions) which is
present and characteristic of blame, but which may not
always be expressed. Owens (2012) draws a distinction
between appropriateness of blame as an angry reaction, and
considerations of the aptness and desirability of feeling or
expressing it. Blame can be defined as an appropriate
emotional reaction without committing to the emotion
being visible or appropriate in every case.
A similar argument is offered by Goldman (2014).
Goldman broadly accepts the Strawsonian position that has
underpinned the affective position on blame—that reactive
attitudes are central to meaningful interpersonal relation-
ships—but argues that antagonistic attitudes such as anger
need not be part of that suite of emotions. He suggests that
a ‘disappointed sadness’ (2014, p. 15) would serve as an
alternative reactive emotion to being wronged, and one that
might be conducive to more constructive human relations.
Finally, we consider approaches to blame that are
either sceptical of it per se, or questioning of the features of
human society that underpin and sustain it as a social
practice. The first is found in the work of philosophers (e.g.
Pereboom 2001) who see determinism as incompatible
with free-will, thus calling into question the notion of
moral responsibility that underpins blame. Blame of any
sort seems unjustified on that account. This line of rea-
soning sits uneasily with the sanction view of blame
(above)—sanctions would be pointless if people are not
free to do differently in the future. Emotions of resentment
which underpin blame under some accounts would also
seem inappropriate if one starts from that premise.
On the second point, Williams (1995) observed that our
attachment to blame as a practice rests on the idea that we
assume that the person we blame shares with us the reasons
for not acting in a certain way—thus, their action resulted
from not paying heed to these reasons (thus justifying the
blame). Williams suggests that we are entitled to neither
assumption, and regards blame as a fiction. To blame is
thus to impose one’s framework of reasons and values on
another’s behaviour or character and judge them in relation
to it. Viewed in this way, judgments of blameworthiness,
and the resulting blame, are forms of uninvited imposition
upon us, and when viewed broadly, ‘A continuing
attempt… to recruit people into a deliberative community
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that shares ethical reasons’ (Williams 1995, p. 16). A
similarly ‘critical’ view of blame is contained in Niezts-
che’s idea (1997, 2003) that our moral judgments and our
systems of morality grow out of feelings of ‘ressenti-
ment’—broadly speaking the fear and envy felt by the
weak in relation to the strong. On this view our feelings of
frustration at wrongdoing are motivated by feelings of envy
and powerlessness in relation to others and our systems of
morality—including blame—are inventions which allow
us, however weak otherwise, to exert power over others
through the judgments that they entitle us (on an equal
footing) to make.
In this section, we have reviewed four different philo-
sophical perspectives on blame—blame viewed as a sanc-
tion to shape future behaviour, blame viewed as a
judgement on relationship impairment, blame viewed as an
emotional reaction to someone having being wronged, and
blame viewed as part of a social system of power relations.
In the next section, we explore some of the implications of
these approaches for the no-blame idea in organizations.
Organizational Blame/No-Blame Reconsidered
We now offer some thoughts on how organizational blame,
and the no-blame idea, may be approached from the per-
spectives of the philosophy of blame. Given that the no-
blame literature is not on the whole explicit about its
conception of blame, a preliminary task is to attempt to
locate it within the philosophical debate on the basis of
what is implied. The first observation is that the no-blame
position is a consequentialist one, and blame is considered
and evaluated with reference to its impact on future out-
comes. Whether we should dispense blame, or refrain from
doing so, depends on whether good—for example, orga-
nizational learning, appropriate risk-taking, disaster
avoidance—will follow from doing so. The desire to avoid
blame serves as a control mechanism for management, or
amongst colleagues, in ensuring that employees behave and
perform to appropriate standards and avoid mistakes. Fur-
ther, when blame is apportioned publicly it may have the
effect of impacting on the future behaviour and perfor-
mance of staff not directly involved. The value of a no-
blame approach to an organization can be evaluated in
terms of the expected benefits, for example arising from
enhanced organizational learning, and set against the costs,
arising for example through implementation or from loss of
management control. This approach underpins discussions
as to whether no-blame approaches may be more desirable
and practicable in some organizational settings than in
others (Provera et al. 2010).
One interpretation would be to see this as congruent
with the utilitarian approach to blame discussed earlier. On
this interpretation, blame acts as sanction to shape beha-
viour, yielding benefits to the organization, yet this sanc-
tion itself may incur greater costs (in terms of loss of
learning, risk-taking, etc.). The overall utility calculation
may favour the removal of the blame. This is not to suggest
that organizations explicitly make this calculation, but this
might be proposed as the underlying logic. An argument
against this view would be that consequentialist thinking of
organizations—as goal-orientated entities they are bound
to do this—does not in itself imply a particular conception
of blame. However blame is understood, organizations (and
organizational thinkers) could take a stance on whether in
some circumstances (or generally) they would be better off
without it. More generally, the evaluation of blame could
then proceed independently from a discussion of its nature.
There is something to be said for this argument. For
example, even if blame were conceived as an emotional
response to things going wrong—i.e. under the ‘affective’
account of blame—it would still be unpleasant to the
recipient, and individuals would presumably modify their
behaviour to avoid it. Identifying the no-blame position as
utilitarian on these grounds seems unwarranted. That is not
to say that it is necessarily wrong, as it is unclear what
conceptualization of blame underpins no-blame
approaches.
However, it is not clear that the separation of the eval-
uation of blame from considerations of its nature is fully
justified, at least in the context of this debate. Whatever the
conception of blame that implicitly underlies no-blame
thinking, it must be of a type that those advocating no-
blame think can practicably be suspended in order to
achieve the desired consequences. It seems legitimate to
consider whether different conceptions of blame are
equally ‘suspendable’ in this sense. There is an argument to
suggest that actions forming part of a deliberative system
of sanctions may be more easily suspended, than an emo-
tional response to wrongdoing. If blame is understood as a
reactive emotion, and further, one that is constitutive of
meaningful human relations (Strawson 1974; Wallace
1994; Owens 2012), this at least raises questions around
how successful organizations might be in attempting to do
without blame, even when they have calculated that it is
desirable so to do.
Clearly, some care is needed in pursuing this line of
argument. Firstly, it assumes a monolithic conception of
blame, yet as we discuss in more detail in the next section,
blame in organizational settings (and elsewhere) may take
different forms. Some organizational blame will be of a
‘whodunit’ (Coates and Tognazzini 2013) or ‘causal’ type
(Vincent 2011), and may have no emotional or judgmental
content. Similarly, it rather assumes that we have no con-
trol over our moral emotions and how we dispense them.
Even those philosophers who are sympathetic to the
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‘reactive attitudes’ discuss the appropriateness of these
reactions and our ability to modify and temper them
(Owens 2014; Goldman 2014). There is an argument to say
that this is particularly the case in the context of organi-
zations, which are controlled environments where people
are socialized into modifying or tempering behaviours,
perhaps particularly emotions, which would not be toler-
ated outside of the workplace.
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which the no-blame idea
goes against the grain of what some philosophers might
consider our ‘natural’ reactions. In the case of very public
organizational disasters, there is a very strong sense in
which people seem to need to hold someone accountable,
and this seems to be disconnected from considerations
around whether this will hamper the process of investiga-
tion, or of learning lessons for the future. It is also dis-
connected from notions of justice that normally underpin
formal organizational sanctions. Someone needs to ‘carry
the can’, and this can be only tenuously related (if at all) to
any causal responsibility they had. Pronouncements by
public figures that blame is counter-productive in these
circumstances often fall on deaf ears, or stimulate an angry
reaction. There seems to be something deep-seated about
our desires to blame in these sorts of situations, and the no-
blame idea arguably runs against the grain of this. Whether
this is the case in less serious, and public, ‘everyday’,
organizational failures is an open question. We can say that
the ‘affective’ account would suggest that it might be.
The feasibility and desirability of no-blame needs to be
considered in relation to ideas around power and control.
Earlier in the article we noted Williams’ thought that blame
served the function of recruiting people to a moral com-
munity whose members share reasons for actions (Williams
1995). It is possible to share Williams’ scepticism around
this function of blame in society at large; however, it is
arguable that work organizations are entities that have a
strong imperative to encourage their members to share
reasons for action, and may be more effective when they do
so. The popular organizational literature is replete with
reference to the imperative for organizations to have
developed strong cultures and shared values. To the extent
to which blaming practices police, preserve, and sustain
these, it is questionable whether organizations will have a
strong incentive to dispense with them—and of course they
may be too deeply entrenched in the culture of the orga-
nization to make this possible. Furthermore, blaming is a
social practice that is embedded in structure of the social
relations in the context in which we observe it. In the
context of work organizations, this is the unbalanced power
relations of employment relationship. Nietzsche’s view of
blame as an invention that allows the weak to fire back at
the strong is interesting, and may have some purchase on
understanding the desire for senior ‘heads to roll’ in
organizational failures. However in organizational settings,
it is perhaps more likely that blame will be used politically
by those with power to do so, for example, blaming others
to shore up one’s own position of power or deflect attention
from one’s own responsibility for error—and there is some
empirical evidence for this (Oexl and Grossman 2013;
Busby 2006).
The discussion above suggests that there are insights to
be gained from applying philosophical ideas to the subject
of blame in organizations. Firstly, this helps to locate and
unpick the implicit assumptions in the organizational lit-
erature around the ‘nature’ of blame. Secondly, it raises
questions about the desirability of doing without blame in
organizations, and about the very possibility of doing so.
Later in the article we will consider the implications of
these ideas, specifically in the context of exploring an
alternative to no-blame. Before doing so, we need to ‘clear
the ground’ by considering and addressing potential
objections to exploring the no-blame idea through the lens
of philosophy.
Is the Philosophy of Blame Relevant
to Organizational Blame?
There are three issues to be discussed in establishing the
extent to which debates around the philosophy of blame
connect with blame in organizations. The first concerns the
suggestion that the debate in philosophy concerns ‘moral’
blame, whereas the blame at issue in the no-blame orga-
nizational literature is of a non-moral character. The sec-
ond concerns the distinction between ‘blame’ and
‘punishment’, and the thought that the latter is really what
is at issue in the no-blame literature. The third is that blame
is a multi-layered concept, and that only some variants of it
are addressed by the philosophy, and only some by the
organizational literature—and these are not necessarily the
same ones.
Moral Blame
Here we deal with the possibility that, as philosophers are
concerned with ‘moral’ blame, and the no-blame literature
is concerned with a much narrower conception of blame as
it relates to error-reporting, the discussion of blame in
philosophy and organizational literatures has no real con-
nection. It is certainly the case that some of the no-blame
literature is concerned with error and organizational
responses to it (e.g. Provera et al. 2010). However, it will
become clear from our review of that literature—and from
the no-blame zeitgeist—that the concept of blame used is
much wider in its scope than error-reporting procedures. It
encompasses a broader consideration of attitudes and
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behaviours in organizations and how people in organiza-
tions should respond to them. For example, excessive risk-
taking, negligence, bullying, discrimination, and dishon-
esty may all be things that people may be blamed for in
organizations, and all of these arguably (see below) have
moral connotations.
In any event, it can be argued that philosophers are not
solely concerned with ‘moral’ blame, or if they are the
distinction between moral and non-moral blame is really
only one that demarks the distinction between blaming
persons and inanimate objects—for example, in the state-
ment ‘my car battery is to blame for my being late this
morning’ (Coates and Tognazzini 2013)—and thus has no
traction on the issue in hand. However, the moral/non-
moral distinction might be of the kind that could be used to
distinguish between the blame that one might place on
someone in ordinary life who has been unfaithful to his
wife, and the blame in an organization that might be
directed at someone who has made an error in judgment,
for example, in recruiting a new member of staff—in
which case it could be a highly relevant distinction. Of
course, lurking under these questions is the question of
what is meant by ‘moral’—a core question in philosophy,
and not one we can resolve here. However, we feel that
there are good grounds for thinking that the moral/non-
moral distinction is not helpful in the current discussion.
Firstly, as we have seen, philosophers who are happy to use
the term ‘moral blame’ are also happy to extend its scope
beyond deliberately harmful acts to carelessness, neglect,
and omissions that damage relations between people.
Secondly, there are philosophers (e.g. Owens 2000) who
argue for the existence of ‘epistemic vices’, failures of
judgment, and understanding—which are equally likely to
be present in organizations—and which merit blame reac-
tions (as much as moral vices such as dishonesty or reck-
lessness). Thus, we follow Williams (1995) in this regard,
and suggest that whether or not things are moral, blaming
of people is an ethical issue (McGreer 2013), which in all
its forms is subject to examination from the perspective of
ethical enquiry.
Our conclusion here, then, is that while there may be
grounds for identifying different forms of blame (which we
discuss below), the moral/non-moral distinction is not the
most useful one to make, and does not support a view that
philosophical and organizational considerations of blame
operate in parallel worlds. The philosophy of blame should
have something to say about organizational blaming.
Blame and Punishment
A second reason for a possible disconnect between phi-
losophy and organizational blame would be acceptance of
an argument that the former is about blame and the latter is
essentially about punishment. In organizational justice
systems, those who break rules or behave badly are subject
to disciplinary action, ranging from warnings through to
dismissal, which may be seen as equivalent (formally) to
punishments in criminal justice systems. As outlined
above, and as Shoemaker (2013) points out, many
philosophers do equate blame with sanction in this way,
and if this is accepted the philosophical discussions would
have direct purchase on organizational blame. However, as
we discussed, many philosophers do not accept that view of
blame, so the distinction between blame and punishment
warrants further discussion. Shoemaker himself draws two
important distinctions between what he calls ‘moral blame’
and punishment. Firstly, the former relates not only to
actions, but to attitudes. Secondly, moral blame occurs
within a community of moral equals, whereas punishment
takes place within a system of authority relations. Shoe-
maker’s examples include military sanctions and punish-
ments in the context of parent/child relations. These
distinctions can be reasonably extended to systems of
organizational sanctions.
It seems clear that some of the discussion on blame in
the organizational literature relates to organizational
sanctions. The idea behind suspending blame to encourage
error-reporting, for example, must include—if it is to have
its desired effect—the idea that organizational sanctions
(even at the level of an oral warning) will be unpleasant to
the recipient. Even so, it is not at all clear that this must be
its only element, or that blame in organizations could not
occur without any form of sanction. Even without formal
organizational sanction, undesirable behaviour might be
met with a blame reaction, for example a withdrawal of
goodwill and cooperation or a judgement of lack of pro-
fessionalism—and this reaction may relate to underlying
attitudes as well as to actions. Given this, we suggest that
the blame/punishment distinction, while an important one,
is not one that should preclude consideration of organiza-
tional blame in the light of the philosophical literature.
Different Types of Blame?
Blame has interested philosophers for a number of reasons,
but one of most significant arises from the idea that blame
is linked to responsibility—we can be (appropriately)
blamed from what we can (appropriately) be held respon-
sible for. However, people can be ‘responsible’ in different
senses, and thus may be ‘to blame’ in different ways.
Vincent (2011) identifies six ways in which agents can be
responsible: capacity responsibility—whether someone is
capable of being regarded as a responsible moral agent in
respect of specific events; causal responsibility—whether
an event can be connected to an agent’s actions; outcome
responsibility—a stronger claim as to whether an event can
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be attributed to an agent’s actions; role responsibility—
whether an agent’s role makes him/her responsible for
particular events; virtue responsibility—whether someone
is a ‘responsible’ person in a general sense; and liability
responsibility—who or what should be ‘held responsible’.
Vincent offers a ‘‘structured taxonomy’’ (2011, p. 19)
which conceptualizes the relations between these notions
of responsibility, and using this it is possible to see how
people might be ‘to blame’ (or not) in different senses. For
example, a small child who caused damage or injury at
school might be to blame in the ‘causal’ sense (threw the
stone), but not in the capacity sense (on account of their
extreme youth), a teacher might be to blame in a ‘role’
sense (he should have provided adequate supervision), the
head teacher might be blamed in the ‘outcome’ sense (poor
supervision, staff training, etc.), and the local education
authority held ‘liable’ (poor systems, failures of gover-
nance, etc.).
An important issue in seeking to apply the philosophical
literature on blame to the organizational no-blame idea is
to be clear as to which form of responsibility/blame is
being discussed. One thought might be that no-blame is
restricted to causal responsibility—or ‘whodunit’ (Coates
and Tognazzini 2013, p. 7). As we reported above, there is
certainly a strong theme in the no-blame literature that
reflects this idea, counselling against devoting energy to
identifying individual ‘culprits’ when that energy (and time
and cost) could be focused on rectifying systemic failures
so that individual errors are less likely to happen in future.
However, it was also clear from that discussion that causal
responsibility and finger pointing was not all that was at
issue. This may even be the case in the case of error-
reporting systems. The example from Busby (2006)
reported earlier is instructive here—the rail workers were
prepared to accept the finger pointing because there was no
blame. Moving beyond error-reporting to other arenas for
organizational blaming, in the examples quoted (childcare
scandals, shipping disasters), role, outcome, and even lia-
bility responsibility/blame were at issue. In terms of real-
izing the espoused organizational learning benefits of no-
blame, releasing people from the fear of role and outcome
blame will be as important as releasing them from the fear
of causal blame. After all, in a learning culture managers
themselves would need to be ‘freed’ to allow their staff to
make mistakes, confident that they will not be blamed
when they do.
In this section, we have explored the extent to which the
philosophy of blame has potential traction on the idea of
no-blame in organizations. We have examined the rele-
vance of a distinction between moral/non-moral blame to
these questions, the relevance of a distinction between
blame and punishment, and the relevance of different
responsibility/blame concepts. Our conclusion has been
that there is still considerable room for the philosophy of
blame to do some work in the field of organizational blame.
A subsidiary conclusion emerging from this discussion is
that the organizational blame literature would benefit from
being more explicit and precise in its use of ‘blame’—a
point that we will return to at the end of the article.
An Alternative to No-Blame?
Our consideration of the implications of the philosophical
literature earlier in the article leads us to some scepticism
around the idea of no-blame, at least as to its extended
application. However, the philosophical discussion alerts
us to the entrenched nature of some of the problems that the
no-blame idea was designed to solve—for example the
association of blame with power, its inhibiting effect on
creativity, innovation and risk-taking, or the emotional and
judgmental reactions which may inhibit openness and
learning. We suggest that there might be value in exploring
alternative ways of addressing these difficulties without
letting go of the notion of blaming altogether.
The suggestion that we put forward for discussion is that
organization scholars might explore the idea of promoting
‘healthier’ blaming practices rather than advocating no-
blame. In the discussion below, we consider what the latter
might involve and how it might be underpinned theoreti-
cally, but first it is necessary to say how it is conceptually
distinct. The sort of approach that we are suggesting shares
the core idea of no-blame, namely that blame can be
repressive and inhibiting. However, it involves explicit
acceptance of two ideas that are absent from the idea of no-
blame in its more generalized form. First, a recognition that
blaming is an inevitable feature of human social interaction
and, second, that it has a positive role in human relation-
ships. In theoretical terms, it would draw something from
each of the dominant philosophical approaches discussed
earlier—recognizing that blame can sometimes (or in part)
be an emotional reaction to someone falling short of the
organizational standards, sometimes (or in part) a judgment
that someone has impaired relations between members of
an organization; and sometimes (or in part) a firm reminder
that certain values and standards of conduct are expected in
that organization. It would incorporate a recognition that
each of these may have damaging effects (as identified by
no-blame proponents), but retain the idea present in many
philosophies of blame, that blame is sustaining of human
communities.
In organizational terms, this idea—in contrast to no-
blame—would find its expression in a clear and explicit
commitment to the idea that blaming can have an appro-
priate role in organizational life, along with a recognition
that seeking to dispense with it may in any case be
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impossible. Yet at the same time, it would incorporate a
recognition that organizational blaming practices and cul-
tures have the potential to be damaging to constructive and
productive work relations. Finding an appropriate balance
between these competing imperatives is the challenge here.
This will vary with the circumstances of particular orga-
nizations, and it is not our intention to offer detailed pre-
scriptions for practice. However, we can offer some
thoughts on the principles and theoretical foundations on
which these might be developed.
The first thing to say is that restraint and tolerance are
likely to be the key underpinning principles in the sort of
approach we have in mind. This would avoid what Watson
(2013) terms a failure of interpretative generosity. As Kelly
(2013, p. 262) notes, ‘‘…when we become emotionally
invested in negative moral assessments of a person whose
failures do not set them apart from most people, we lose
sight of our common human frailty’’. Setting the bound-
aries around these judgments suitably narrowly is likely to
lead to many of the benefits claimed by proponents of no-
blame, both in terms of managing risk and organizational
learning. In terms of risk, we draw parallels with Farson
and Keyes’ (2002) ‘failure tolerant leader’. These authors
acknowledge that where organizational members are ter-
rified of failure and of making mistakes, risk-taking may be
inhibited. Yet risk-taking is an organizational necessity in
many circumstances. Such a leader will encourage a cul-
ture of intelligent risk-taking and remove any climate of
fear of blame in innovative areas of the operation—while
reserving blame for acts of recklessness. Similar observa-
tions apply in relation to error and learning. Here, leaders
would refrain from blame where individual errors arise
from systemic deficiencies and where people make mis-
takes born of inexperience or lack of training, thus creating
a climate where individual and organizational learning can
flourish.
The challenge in developing such an approach is in
setting the boundaries, for example between recklessness
and intelligent risk-taking, or—more generally—the limits
of responsible organizational practice. To our mind, these
norms are formed within communities of practice (Fuller
2007) in organizational or professional settings. When
philosophers talk of blame in relation to (the contravention
of) shared values or to what one ought to have done, they
refer to obligations within relationships, or human values
more generally. In organizational settings, we need to
consider the professional, occupational, or organizational
values and obligations that set the boundaries for the
appropriateness of blaming. These communities of practice
not only set these boundaries through their everyday
practice, and their reflection on it, but are the context for
the development of the appropriate responses to trans-
gression. From this follows a practical implication for
leadership development and professional training, in that
people learn to blame appropriately within their organiza-
tional/professional context, and also learn to be blamed.
This suggests that organizations could profitably pay
specific attention to developing constructive blaming
practices alongside the development of other aspects of
leadership and professional ethics (McPherson 2013).
Another implication of linking blame with the idea of
communities of practice and professional values is that it is
possible to see how ‘normal’ blaming practices may be
suspended in specific circumstances (Provera et al. 2010),
for example in the airline industry. The development of
shared norms and trust, underpinned by the appropriate
professional and leadership ethics, may make this possible.
However, we return here to an earlier thought, that sus-
pension of our normal blaming tendencies in this way is
likely to create tensions and may be difficult to sustain in
settings where the imperative to do so is not so strong.
Clearly these ideas would need development and a
conceptual underpinning, and providing these is beyond the
scope of the current article. We note that this approach has
no obvious home within existing philosophies of blame.
However, the idea that moderation of one’s blaming ten-
dencies is one that may be developed and fostered, and the
notion that blaming norms and practice inhabit a commu-
nity—and are related to the values and development of that
community—chime with some of the key ideas in virtue
ethics (Foot 2002; Hursthouse 2001). ‘Virtue responsibil-
ity’ also forms part of Vincent’s (2011) taxonomy of
responsibility concepts, and this merits further exploration
in the context of organizational blaming. We are not aware
of work which explicitly locates an understanding of blame
within virtue theory. Our thoughts in this section suggest
that making such a connection might be fruitful in pro-
viding a foundation for new approaches to understanding
blame in organizations.
Conclusion
The article began by considering the notion of no-blame,
an idea developing in the management literature which
draws on the idea that blame may be an inhibitor to
organization learning, system improvement, innovation,
and risk-taking. We noted that the concept of blame was
rarely defined or explored in this literature, and contrasted
this with extensive philosophical literature on blame which
devotes considerable attention to pinning down this con-
cept—and offers a range of divergent and contested for-
mulations. On the basis of our review of the philosophical
literature on blame, we have offered some preliminary
thoughts on the light that this can shed on the no-blame
idea. Our conclusion here was that the philosophy of blame
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was helpful in forming an interpretation of the concept of
blame that is being used—albeit implicitly—in the no-
blame literature. The conception of blame in the latter was
similar to that which sees blame as a sanction (though not
necessarily underpinned by a utilitarian view with which
this is most commonly associated with in philosophy) and
most divergent from affective and relational perspectives
that see blame as central to, perhaps constitutive of, normal
human social interaction. We also argued that the evalua-
tion of blame, such that might inform an organizational
desire to dispense with it, cannot be entirely separated from
an understanding of what blame is.
Given this, if the blame at issue in organizations (or at
least some of it) is of the affective type, there may be
considerable challenges in dispensing with it, even if that
were thought to be conducive to organizational ends. This
led us to the thought that while no-blame might be prac-
ticable and desirable in some restricted organization set-
tings, an acceptance of blaming, but a tempering of its
application, might be more realistic and productive more
generally.
The no-blame idea is an interesting one in organiza-
tional studies, with the potential (rightly) identified by its
proponents to make organizations more effective and better
places to work. We have identified a need for the idea to be
placed on a more secure conceptual footing, and have
argued that application of the philosophy of blame has
potential to do that. Our discussions here have only been a
foundation for that endeavour, though hopefully a useful
one, and we make some recommendations as to how this
project might be taken forward.
The first is that work should be done to clarify the
blaming concepts at play in work organizations. Vincent’s
(2011) taxonomy of responsibility concepts offers a
framework for doing this. This would be a foundation for a
more precise articulation of which forms of blame are, and
should be, subject to the no-blame idea.
The second represents a call for empirical work to
explore blaming practices in organizations. In the absence
of this, a detailed understanding of how and why blame
happens at work and with what effect is lacking. Our
review of the philosophical literature on blame offers the
basis of a conceptual framework for researchers to do this.
The third is to explore and develop alternatives to no-
blame. In the previous section, we sketched out the basis
for one such approach, and we recognize there are doubt-
less other ways of approaching this. Our own suggestion
located the development of blaming norms within com-
munities of organizational and professional practice and
emphasized that blaming practices are learnt in this con-
text. We also suggested that restraint and tolerance might
be appropriate principles underpinning the development of
organizational blaming norms. This led us to suggest virtue
ethics as a possible framework for developing an alterna-
tive to no-blame. Doing so would complement existing
efforts to apply virtue ethics to organizational decision-
making and behaviour (Crossan et al. 2013; McPherson
2013), and would be an interesting and potentially fruitful
line of enquiry for researchers to pursue.
To conclude, the contribution of this article has been to
open a dialogue between the philosophy of blame and the
organizational literature on blame, and to identify the
nature of that conversation and where it might lead. This
will be useful for organization scholars in developing the
idea of no-blame, or indeed alternatives to it. We also hope
that it will stimulate some debate.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
BBC. (2011). Shoesmith: I don’t do blame. Retrieved May 11, 2015,
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9499000/
9499424.stm
BBC. (2015). Harriet Harman warning over labour blame game.
Retrieved May 11, 2015, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-32686769
Bennett, J. (1980). Accountability. In Z. Van Straaten (Ed.),
Philosophical subjects: Essays presented to P.F. Strawson (pp.
14–47). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Busby, J. (2006). Failure to mobilize in reliability-seeking organisa-
tions: Two cases from the UK railway. Journal of Management
Studies, 43(6), 1375–1393.
Coates, J., & Tognazzini, N. (2013). The contours of blame. In D.
Coates & N. Tognazzini (Eds.), Blame: Its nature and norms (pp.
3–26). New York: Oxford University Press.
Crossan, M., Mazutis, D., & Seijts, G. (2013). In search of virtue: The
role of virtues, values and character strengths in ethical decision
making. Journal of Business Ethics, 113, 567–581.
Farson, R., & Keyes, R. (2002). The failure-tolerant leader. Harvard
Business Review, 80, 64–71.
Foot, P. (2002). Virtues and vices and other essays in moral
philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Franklin, C. (2013). Valuing blame. In D. Coates & N. Tognazzini
(Eds.), Blame: Its nature and norms (pp. 207–233). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Fuller, A. (2007). Critiquing theories of learning and communities of
practice. In J. Hughes, N. Hewson, & L. Unwin (Eds.),
Communities of practice: Critical perspectives (pp. 17–29).
London: Routledge.
Goldman, D. (2014). Modification of the reactive attitudes. Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, 95, 1–22.
Gronewold, U., Gold, A., & Salterio, S. (2013). Reporting self-made
errors: The impact of organizational error-management climate
and error type. Journal of Business Ethics, 117, 189–208.
Holmes, A. (2010). A reflection on the Bushfire Royal Commission—
Blame, accountability and responsibility. Australian Journal of
Public Administration, 69(4), 387–391.
Managing Without Blame? Insights from the Philosophy of Blame
123
Hursthouse, R. (2001). On virtue ethics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Kelly, E. (2013). What is an excuse? In D. Coates & N. Tognazzini
(Eds.), Blame: Its nature and norms (pp. 224–243). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Lang, J. (2013, January 21). Taking sides on cruise safety. Nautilus
Telegraph. Retrieved June 15, 2015, from http://content.yudu.
com/Library/A20fuf/NautilusTelegraphJan/resources/21.htm
Levy, N. (2005). The good, the bad and the blameworthy. Journal of
Ethics and Social Philosophy, 2, 2–16.
McGreer, V. (2013). Standing in judgment. In D. Coates & N.
Tognazzini (Eds.), Blame: Its nature and norms (pp. 27–48).
New York: Oxford University Press.
McPherson, D. (2013). Vocational virtue ethics: Prospects for a virtue
ethics approach to business. Journal of Business Ethics, 118,
283–296.
National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in England
(NAGSPE) the ‘‘Berwick Report’’. (2013). Improving the safety
of patients in England: A promise to learn-a commitment to act.
Retrieved June 15, 2015, from https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/226703/Berwick_
Report.pdf
Nietzsche, F. (1997). Beyond good and evil. New York: Dover.
Nietzsche, F. (2003). The genealogy of morals. New York: Dover.
Oexl, R., & Grossman, Z. (2013). Shifting the blame to a powerless
intermediary. Experimental Economics, 16, 306–312.
Owens, D. (2000). Reason without freedom. London: Routledge.
Owens, D. (2012). Shaping the normative landscape. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Provera, B., Montefusco, A., & Canato, A. (2010). A ‘no blame’
approach to organizational learning. British Journal of Manage-
ment, 21, 1057–1074.
Scanlon, T. (2008). Moral dimensions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Schilling, J., & Kluge, A. (2009). Barriers to organizational learning:
An integration of theory and research. International Journal of
Management Reviews, 11(3), 337–360.
Senge, P. (2006). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the
learning organization. London: Random House.
Sher, G. (2006). In praise of blame. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. (2013). Moral blame and moral protest. In D. Coates & N.
Tognazzini (Eds.), Blame: Its nature and norms (pp. 27–48).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Strawson, P. (1974). Freedom and resentment, and other essays.
London: Methuen.
Tilly, C. (2008). Credit and blame. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Tjosvold, D., Yu, Z.-Y., & Hui, C. (2004). Team learning from
mistakes: The contribution of cooperative goals and problem-
solving. Journal of Management Studies, 41(7), 1223–1245.
Uribe, C., Schewekhard, S., Dev, S., & Marsh, G. (2002). Perceived
barriers to medical-error reporting: An exploratory investigation.
Journal of Healthcare Management, 47(4), 263–280.
Vince, R., & Saleem, T. (2004). The impact of caution and blame on
organizational learning. Management Learning, 35(2), 133–154.
Vincent, N. (2011). A structured taxonomy of responsibility concepts.
In I. van der Poel, J. van den Hoven, & N. Vincent (Eds.), Moral
responsibility: Beyond free will and determinism. New York:
Springer.
Wallace, R. (1994). Responsibility and the moral sentiments.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wallace, R. (2008). Dispassionate opprobrium: On blame and the
reactive sentiments. University of Berkeley. Retrieved July 22,
2010, from www.philosophy.berkeley.edu/file/461/Blame.pdf
Waring, J. (2005). Beyond blame: Cultural barriers to medical
incident reporting. Social Science and Medicine, 60(9),
1927–1935.
Watson, G. (2013). Standing in judgment. In D. Coates & N.
Tognazzini (Eds.), Blame: Its nature and norms (pp. 282–302).
New York: Oxford University Press.
Weick, K., & Sutcliffe, K. (2001). Managing the unexpected.
Assuring high performance in and age of complexity. Hoboken,
NJ: Wiley.
Williams, B. (1995). Making sense of humanity, and other philo-
sophical papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
B. Lupton, R. Warren
123
